DHS Violated Domestic Intelligence Rules by Retaining Chicago Police Gang Data
The Department of Homeland Security retained Chicago Police Department records on approximately 900 residents for seven months beyond required deletion deadlines, violating rules designed to prevent domestic intelligence operations from targeting US citizens. The data, which included gang affiliation records known for inaccuracies and racial disparities, was part of an experiment to test how local intelligence could feed federal watchlists. Internal oversight failures and procedural lapses allowed the violation to go unnoticed for months, raising serious concerns about privacy protections and intelligence oversight.
The Department of Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence & Analysis (I&A) faced significant scrutiny after retaining Chicago Police Department records on approximately 900 residents for seven months beyond mandated deletion deadlines. This violation of domestic intelligence rules occurred during an experimental program testing how local law enforcement data could be used to populate federal watchlists for border and airport screening.
The Data Sharing Experiment
In summer 2021, a field intelligence officer within DHS's I&A office initiated contact with Chicago Police Department officials to request bulk access to the city's gang records. The stated objective was to evaluate whether street-level intelligence could help identify undocumented gang members during airport security screenings and border crossings. This initiative followed an FBI decision to expand its Transnational Organized Crime Actor Detection Program (TADP) to include the Latin Kings street gang, which originated in Chicago.
The data transfer triggered mandatory privacy reviews through DHS's Data Access Review Council (DARC), which spent over six months evaluating the proposal. In January 2022, the agreement established specific terms requiring deletion of all US-person data within one year and submission of a six-month progress report. Neither requirement was ultimately fulfilled.
Systemic Oversight Failures
The compliance breakdown began with critical staffing gaps. The original field officer who initiated the project left their position before the paperwork was finalized, and their replacement didn't arrive for eight months. During this period, the required agreement was signed not by the undersecretary for intelligence and analysis as policy mandated, but by the office's chief information officer—a procedural violation that investigators later described as having unclear justification.
By April 2023, the deletion deadline passed without action. Months elapsed before oversight staff discovered the violation, finding that I&A had retained at least 797 documents containing domestic intelligence in direct contravention of established rules. The records remained on federal servers until November 2023, when I&A finally deleted the dataset and formally documented the breach.
Problematic Source Data
The Chicago Police Department's gang records were already notorious for significant accuracy issues prior to the DHS transfer. City inspectors had documented numerous problems, including entries for people purportedly born before 1901, infants labeled as gang members, and individuals associated with no specific gang organization. The data contained derogatory terms like "SCUM BAG" and "TURD" entered by officers, and required neither arrest nor conviction for inclusion.
According to WIRED's investigation, Chicago maintained at least 18 different locations where gang data was stored, with police unable to definitively account for all information in their possession. The data showed significant racial disparities, with 95% of those labeled as gang members being Black or Latino.
Broader Implications
This incident highlights concerns about federal intelligence agencies circumventing local sanctuary protections. Spencer Reynolds, senior counsel at the Brennan Center for Justice, noted that "This intelligence office is a workaround to so-called sanctuary protections that limit cities like Chicago from direct cooperation with ICE. Federal intelligence officers can access the data, package it up, and then hand it off to immigration enforcement, evading important policies to protect residents."
The episode occurred against the backdrop of expanding federal watchlisting capabilities and DHS initiatives to merge data across previously separated systems. A March 2025 executive order encouraged federal departments to "eliminate information silos across the government," while DHS's AI programs aim to combine public and commercial data for enforcement and surveillance purposes.
Despite the program's termination and subsequent mitigation measures requiring staff training and improved oversight procedures, congressional auditors from the Government Accountability Office reported in July 2025 that I&A still lacks basic controls needed to track intelligence collection and usage. The incident serves as a stark reminder of the challenges in balancing national security objectives with civil liberties protections.
